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Abstract
We construct a model in which the ambiguity of candidates allows
them to increase the number of voters to whom they appeal when
voters have intense preferences for one of the alternatives available.
An ambiguous candidate may oer voters with dierent preferences
the hope that their most preferred alternative will be implemented.
We nd conditions under which ambiguous strategies are chosen in
equilibrium. These conditions include the case in which there is an
outcome that is a majority winner against all other outcomes but is not
the most preferred outcome for a majority of voters. It is shown that
if the number of candidates or parties increases, ambiguity will not be
possible in equilibrium, but a larger set of possible policies increases
the chance that at least one candidate will choose to be ambiguous in
equilibrium.
JEL: D72
Keywords: ambiguity, elections.
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"Ambiguity thus increases the number of voters to whom a party may appeal.
This fact encourages parties in a two party system to be as equivocal as possi-
ble about their stands on each controversial issue. And since both parties nd
it rational to be ambiguous, neither is forced by the other's clarity to take a
more precise stand."
Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (1957)
1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to analyze the strategic use of ambiguity by candi-
dates or parties in electoral competition. While there is general agreement
that politicians choose sometimes to be ambiguous, it is not clear how such
strategic ambiguity is to be reconciled with models based on rational vot-
ers with standard preferences. Given a set of alternatives or policies, the
ambiguity of candidates will be represented by nondegenerate probability
distributions or lotteries over the set of policies or pure alternatives. A lot-
tery that assigns probability one to a certain policy (a degenerate lottery)
reects no ambiguity. These lotteries are interpreted as the voters' beliefs
about the policy preferences of the candidates. The relevance of the pres-
ence of ambiguity with respect to a candidate during an electoral campaign
is reected in the vote: voters' beliefs about the candidates' preferences will
determine how they vote. If the set of alternatives is an interval of the real
line, only risk loving voters would prefer an ambiguous strategy to the de-
generate lottery that assigned probability one to the expected value of that
lottery. However, if the space of alternatives is multidimensional, the ex-
pected value of a lottery may have no meaning as an outcome in itself. In
this case, even risk averse voters may prefer a nondegenerate lottery to any
certain outcome, and candidates may choose ambiguous strategies in equilib-
rium even when there is an unambiguous strategy that is a majority winner
among pure alternatives. Ambiguous strategies arise as equilibrium outcomes
because they provide voters with "intense" preferences with the hope that
their most preferred outcome might be chosen.
A simple example will illustrate this point. Consider the problem in
which one of three equally populated cities is to become capital of a country.
Suppose that the preferences of the people is that their rst choice is their
own city, and that they are almost indierent between the other two cities but
have a slight preference for the closer of the two. Suppose further that there is
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an election with two candidates vying for the position to be the one to choose
the capital city. If one of the candidates convinces voters that he strongly
prefers one of the three cities, the second candidate's optimal strategy is to
rule that city out, but try to convince the voters that he truly doesn't know
which of the remaining two cities is his favorite. Voters in the identied
city of choice of the rst candidate will prefer that candidate, but the voters
in the other two cities will all prefer the uncommitted candidate, since he
oers at least some hope that their (strongly preferred) rst choice will be
the outcome. The outcome, of course, will be that the second candidate who
refused to commit will be elected. Note that this is true even if the choice
of the rst candidate is the Condorcet winner among the three cities. In
essence, the intensity of the voters' preferences for their rst choice makes
ambiguity strategically attractive for candidates.
We reiterate the point made above that the intensity of voters' preferences
for their most preferred city has nothing to do with risk loving attitudes. Risk
averse voters may naturally prefer a lottery that puts equal probability on the
two unchosen cities to the certainty of the city identied by the unambiguous
candidate. In this example, there is no alternative that would oer voters
the "expected value" of the lottery as an alternative to the lottery; there is
no such certain alternative here.
We will set out a model to investigate formally the circumstances in
which ambiguity will arise in equilibrium in candidate elections. Our formal
model is Downsian (that is, candidates do not care about implemented policy,
but rather, care only about holding oce). The insights it provides extend
beyond this framework, however. In our model an election is a three stage
game in which players, candidates and voters alike, care only about the policy
that will be implemented after the election. Their preferences are thus dened
on the set of policy alternatives, and their objective is to maximize their
expected utility. Voters know that the winner of the election will decide which
policy to implement depending on his private policy preferences. However,
at the time voters have to cast their vote, they do not know the candidates'
policy preferences with certainty; they only have beliefs about them. The
rst stage of the election game is the electoral campaign, in which candidates
attempt to induce beliefs in voters to aect favorably the outcome of the
election. In the second stage voters choose among the candidates according
to their policy preferences and to the beliefs they have formed about the
candidates' preferences. Finally, at the third stage the winner of the election
chooses a policy.
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A central feature of our analysis is the manner in which these three stages
are linked together. We assume that candidates cannot credibly commit to
implement arbitrary policies. We will assume that there is a more compli-
cated process linking a candidate's strategy choice in the rst stage and the
beliefs voters have about the outcome that is likely to arise in the last stage
should the candidate be elected. Specically, consider the decision in the
nal stage of the candidate who has won the election. His objective is to
implement a policy that is optimal according to his preferences, and he is
the only player of the game. Our assumption that candidates cannot credibly
commit to specic policies implies that the strategies available to the candi-
date at this point coincide with the set of policies. Thus, he will implement
his most preferred policy.
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The link between the second and third stage is
the usual one for two candidate competition: the candidate that obtains a
majority of votes wins the election.
Anticipating the candidates' behavior in the last stage, voters will cast
their vote for the candidate who provides them with a higher expected util-
ity, the expectation taken with respect to their beliefs about candidates'
preferences. Voters are assumed to update their beliefs rationally during the
campaign stage.
We assume that the objective of all players is to maximize expected utility
of the policy ultimately chosen, hence, for any beliefs that voters may have
about one candidate, the second candidate will maximize his expected utility
by maximizing his chance of being elected. Thus at the campaign stage
both candidates compete solely for the votes and they will try to induce
in voters beliefs that maximize their chances of winning. It follows then
that the solution to the three stage election game, in which all players have
preferences on policies and care only about the policy that will be nally
implemented, will be the same as the solution to the simpler game in which
both candidates care only about winning the election.
The question, then, is how candidates can inuence voters' beliefs. One
possibility is to model the exchange of information between candidates and
voters at the campaign stage as a cheaptalk game: candidates send costless
signals to voters, and voters rationally update their beliefs about the candi-
dates' preferences (types). Harrington (1992) showed that in the equilibria
1
We consider the situation in which there is a single election. When there is a sequence
of elections that a candidate may be involved in, there may be a tradeo between present
and future elections. This is discussed in detail in the concluding section.
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of such a game, all candidates send the same signal (pooling equilibrium),
and therefore voters realize that the signals provide no information about the
true preferences of the candidates, and do not update their beliefs at all. The
intuition that candidates cannot favorably aect voters' beliefs is straightfor-
ward: any candidate who nds himself disadvantaged in the cheaptalk stage
can exactly mimic the announcements of the other candidate.
Campaign statements may aect voters' beliefs only to the extent that
they convey information about candidates' preferences, and hence, future
policy choice. For campaign statements to convey information in equilibrium,
voters must update their beliefs dierently upon hearing a statement made
by dierent candidates. One way that this can occur is if statements are
supported by evidence regarding candidates' true preferences; in other words,
the statements are not cheaptalk. For example, a candidate could make
public his past tax records or document his past voting record (or some
part of it).
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This implies that a candidate can induce a restricted set of
beliefs in voters, and that dierent candidates may be able to induce dierent
sets of beliefs in voters (Bill Clinton stating that he is committed to a law
that gay marriages may well have more impact than Bob Dole making the
same statement). Furthermore, the changes in voters' beliefs that can be
induced would naturally be biased towards beliefs that are closer to his true
preferences.
Consequently, we can reduce the initial three stage election game to a one
stage game with two Downsian candidates. The candidates care only about
winning, and have (typically) dierent strategy sets that are the beliefs they
may induce in voters. We will analyze this model to understand the con-
ditions under which candidates may be ambiguous in equilibrium. Initially,
we will deal with the case in which there are two candidates, or parties, and
three alternatives, but these restrictions will then be relaxed.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we review
related literature. Section 3 presents the formal description of the reduced
form version of the election game. In section 4 we present and discuss the
results on ambiguity in equilibrium for two-party competition. Section 5
presents an extension of the model with uncertainty on the voters' preferences
and we replicate our previous ndings. In section 6 we show that increasing
2
We don't suggest that such statements provide denitive proof of a candidate's prefer-
ences, only that they are examples of acts that candidates can take that other candidates
cannot.
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the number of candidates or parties decreases the possibility of ambiguity in
equilibrium. Finally, section 7 oers some concluding remarks.
2 Related Literature
Fishburn (1972) provides one of the rst formal results about ambiguity in
electoral competition. He shows that for any set of alternatives, nite or
innite, and for any distribution of voters' preferences which satisfy rela-
tively weak assumptions (conditions that are only necessary for expected
utility representation), if we consider the set of all lotteries over alternatives
as the choice set, the only possible Condorcet winner will be a degenerate
lottery. Since the equilibrium outcome of a two-candidate competition a la
Downs must coincide with the Condorcet winner, we cannot have ambiguity
in equilibrium in such a model.
Since this result holds for any set of alternatives, and any reasonable
distribution of voters' preferences, ambiguity can only arise as an equilibrium
outcome if we depart from Fishburn's assumptions. In the game derived
from Fishburn's model it is assumed that the candidates' strategy sets are
the same: the set of all lotteries over alternatives or policies. A model that
leads to pure strategy equilibria clearly must introduce dierences in the
candidates' strategy sets.
Shepsle (1972) considers a standard spatial model, where the set of alter-
natives is the real line and voters' preferences are single-peaked. Since this
is a special case of Fishburn's model, the result discussed above applies if
the strategy sets for the candidates are assumed to be the set of all lotteries.
Shepsle introduces an asymmetry in the candidates' choice sets by restrict-
ing the incumbent to choose only degenerate lotteries, and the challenger
is restricted to choose only nondegenerate lotteries. Shepsle nds that the
challenger can only win the election if a majority of the voters' preferences
exhibit risk loving, and these voters' ideal points lie in a neighborhood of the
median voter's ideal point.
In this model, the defeat of the median voter's most preferred policy
by an ambiguous strategy arises because a majority of voters derive utility
from ambiguity. Thus, the choice of ambiguity by candidates during electoral
campaigns is explained by the preferences of the decisive voters for ambiguity.
This result certainly implies Downs' claim: "Ambiguity thus increases the
number of voters to whom a party may appeal", but the explanation is less
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than compelling since it rests on the questionable assumption that voters
may be risk loving.
In this paper we set forth a Downsian model with an asymmetry in the
candidates' strategy sets and provide conditions under which a candidate may
choose an ambiguous strategy and win the election, even when his choice set
contains degenerate lotteries. Hence, we also have candidates who choose
ambiguous strategies in equilibrium in order to appeal to a larger number of
voters, as Downs (1957) suggested, but, unlike Shepsle, with voters who do
not have a direct preference for ambiguity. They derive utility only from the
policy that is nally implemented; they prefer an ambiguous candidate only
if he provides them with a higher expected utility. An ambiguous candidate
provides dierent voters with the hope that their most preferred alternative
will be chosen.
In the literature there are several approaches that oer alternative ex-
planations for ambiguity that dier in spirit. These approaches assume that
at the campaign stage candidates can credibly commit to implement certain
policies should they win the election. The implication of this assumption is
that at the last stage of the election game the winner of the election can only
implement the policies to which he has committed during the campaign.
Under this assumption, the campaign stage may be represented as before
as a signaling game, but in this case the signals that candidates send are
costly, since they constrain the set of strategies candidates will have avail-
able once in oce. Banks (1990) shows that if the cost of the signals is high
enough, candidates with strong policy preferences decide to reveal their pref-
erences to voters (commit to their most preferred policy) at the campaign
stage: information revelation obtains in equilibrium . If the signaling costs
are low, candidates' strategies in equilibrium are uninformative, and when
the costs approach zero the model approaches Harrington's (discussed be-
fore). Notice that the reduced election game in this case diers from the one
obtained when candidates cannot commit in a very relevant characteristic: a
candidate's chances to win the election depend on the policy that he will im-
plement in the last stage of the game. Therefore, at the campaign stage when
candidates maximize their expected utility they face a tradeo: committing
to their most preferred policy increases their utility when in oce but might
decrease their chances of winning the election. Thus, an ambiguous strategy
seems a natural way for candidates to optimize.
Aragones and Neeman (1998) explore this tradeo in order to obtain am-
biguity in equilibrium in two dierent frameworks: a spatial model, and a
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model with a nite number of policies. In both cases voters are assumed to
be risk averse, but when the indirect preference for ambiguity of the candi-
dates is strong enough they will choose ambiguous strategies in equilibrium.
Alesina and Cukierman (1990) analyze a model in which two candidates face
the same tradeo, but in a dierent setting. They construct a two period
game of repeated elections, and assume that voters form beliefs on candi-
dates' policy preferences from the observation of the outcome of the previous
election game. In their model, the outcome of the game observed by the
voters depends stochastically on the policy implemented and the incumbent
is allowed to choose the precision of the signal the voters receive. The choice
of a low precision, that will hide information on the policy implemented, op-
timally solves the tradeo faced by the incumbent, and is the representation
of ambiguity in this setting.
3 The model
There are two candidates who compete for votes in an election. We
assume that there are three alternatives: Z = fA;B;Cg. We denote by 4Z
the set of probability distributions over the set of alternatives
4Z = f(p
A
; p
B
; p
C
) : p
A
; p
B
; p
C
 0; p
A
+ p
B
+ p
C
= 1g:
We will abstract from the process by which politicians induce beliefs and
model a politician's strategies as those beliefs that he induce in the voters.
We discuss this reduced form aspect of our model and the type of processes
that would justify it in the discussion section. We denote byW
i
 Z the set
of beliefs that candidate i can induce in voters; p
i
2 W
i
represents a strategy
for candidate i. We will say that a strategy is ambiguous if it represents
nondegenerate beliefs.
We focus on a particular class of strategy sets motivated by the assump-
tions discussed in the introduction. We will consider strategy sets for can-
didate i whose most preferred policy is alternative Z
i
that contain all prob-
ability distributions over the set of alternatives Z that assign a minimum
probability of a
i
> 0 to alternative Z
i
. Formally W
i
= fp 2 Z : p
Z
i
 a
i
g
for some a
i
2 [0; 1]. We dene similarly the strategy sets for candidates with
other most preferred policies. Such a strategy set implies that a candidate is
able to convince voters of his true preferred policy and, in addition, is able
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to induce in voters beliefs that to a limited extent his most preferred policy
choice is one of the other alternatives.  can be interpreted as the extent to
which the candidate is able to be ambiguous. The structure we place on the
candidates' strategy sets is stronger than necessary for our results but eases
exposition. We discuss below how the structure of the sets can be weakened
without altering our results.
We assume that there are N voters, where N is a positive odd integer.
Voters have preferences over alternatives that can be represented by von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. We normalize a voter's utility func-
tion so that it assigns one to the most preferred alternative and zero to the
least preferred; we denote by x 2 [0; 1] the utility of the intermediate alter-
native. Hence, each voter is characterized by an ordering of the alternatives
represented by u : Z ! f0; x; 1g where x 2 [0; 1] represents the intensity of
the voter's preferences. Its worthwhile commenting on the interpretation of
x. If the alternatives have a natural linear order (such as varying amounts
of money), "intense" preferences (i.e., x < :5) correspond to risk loving pref-
erences. But as the city example in the introduction illustrates, it may be
the case that voters have intense preferences in problems unrelated to risk
preferences.
We will restrict attention to the case in which voters who have the same
preference order have the same preference intensity as well for the sake of
clarity. Hence, there are six types of voters, each with one of the six possible
ordinal (strict) rankings of the three alternatives. We will use G
k
both to
denote the name of one of these groups of voters and to denote the number
of voters in that group; no confusion should arise from this abuse of notation.
The preferences for each of the groups are given in the following table.
G
1
A  B  C
G
2
A  C  B
G
3
B  A  C
G
4
B  C  A
G
5
C  A  B
G
6
C  B  A
Given a voter's beliefs, he or she votes for the candidate that maximizes
10
his or her expected utility
3
. That is, voter j votes for candidate 1 if and only
if E
p
1
u
j
> E
p
2
u
j
(E
p
k
u
j
is the expected utility for voter j with respect to his
probability beliefs about candidate k
0
s most preferred policy), and votes for
candidate 2 if and only if E
p
1
u
j
< E
p
2
u
j
, and does not vote if E
p
1
u
j
= E
p
2
u
j
.
We analyze rst the case in which candidates know the distribution of
voters' preferences and their intensities. We provide conditions under which
pure strategy Nash equilibria exist, and further, when they involve one or
the other candidate being ambiguous.
4 Ambiguity as an Equilibrium Outcome
Our aim is to demonstrate conditions under which candidates will choose
non-degenerate lotteries in equilibrium, that is, choose to induce beliefs that
leaves voters uncertain about the outcome that will be chosen if the candidate
is elected. We begin by observing that if one of the pure alternatives is the
rst choice of a majority of voters, then no lottery can defeat it. In this
case this alternative is the Condorcet winner (an alternative that defeats all
other alternatives in pairwise elections using majority rule) in the set of pure
alternatives Z as well as in the set of lotteries over pure alternatives, Z. A
degenerate lottery that assigns probability one to this alternative will defeat
any other lottery in Z. Therefore, if the lottery that assigns probability
one to the Condorcet winner is available to one of the candidates (that is,
in W
i
, the set of beliefs candidate i can induce), then it will be chosen in
equilibrium and it will defeat any lottery chosen by the opponent. Thus,
there cannot be ambiguity in this case.
A more interesting situation arises when the preferences of the voters are
such that no pure alternative is the rst choice of a majority of voters but
there is a Condorcet winner among the pure alternatives, that is, a pure
alternative that defeats all other alternatives in Z in pairwise elections using
majority rule. In this case, it is still possible that a lottery might defeat this
alternative under majority rule. Thus, even if a candidate can convince the
voters that he will choose the alternative that is most preferred by a majority
to any other alternative, this candidate may be defeated by an opponent who
3
We assume that preferences over lotteries can be presented by expected utility for
ease of exposition. Our results would still hold for a broader class of preferences satisfying
some but not all of the axioms needed for expected utility.
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chooses to be ambiguous.
4
Without loss of generality assume that alternative
B is the Condorcet winner in the set of pure alternatives, but is not the rst
choice of a majority of voters. Suppose also that this is candidate 1's most
preferred outcome; we will refer to this candidate as the Condorcet candidate.
This candidate has available a strategy that induces beliefs in voters that put
probability 1 on this outcome by assumption. Suppose the other candidate's
most preferred outcome is A. If this candidate has limited ability to be
ambiguous, voters will believe with probability close to 1 that A will be the
outcome if he is elected. Since B is a Condorcet winner that defeats A, it
will also defeat lotteries that put very high probability on A. Consequently,
if the second candidate has suciently limited ability to be ambiguous, the
rst candidate can be guarantee to voters that he prefers B and win the
election. Hence, again, the winning strategy will be unambiguous.
But suppose that the second candidate has greater scope for being am-
biguous. Specically, suppose he can induce in voters beliefs that his most
preferred outcome is either A or C, with the probability on each being close
to 1/2. If each group of voters G
i
has intense preferences (i.e., x
i
< :5), all
voters whose rst choice is not B will prefer this lottery to the certainty of
getting A. Hence, when voters have intense preferences and candidates have
sucient scope to be ambiguous, an ambiguous candidate will defeat one
known to favor the Condorcet winner. Note that it may not be necessary for
the ambiguous candidate to be able to induce a probability close to 1/2 on
the outcome that is not his most preferred. While this degree of latitude to
be ambiguous is sucient to defeat the Condorcet winner when voters have
intense preferences, the level of ambiguity necessary to be able to defeat the
Condorcet winner is related to the intensity of preferences: the more intense
the preferences (i.e., the smaller the x), the lower will be the required degree
of ambiguity. If there is any scope at all for ambiguity, for suciently small
x the Condorcet winner will be defeated.
The argument above does not demonstrate that the candidate who can
guarantee voters that the Condorcet winner is his most preferred outcome will
lose, only that suciently ambiguous candidates will defeat this candidate if
he makes known to voters his most preferred outcome. If the candidate asso-
ciated with the Condorcet winner has limited scope to be ambiguous himself,
he will be defeated. But, if he has sucient scope himself to be ambiguous,
he may still have a winning strategy. What this argument demonstrates is
4
An example along these lines with three voters was constructed by Zeckhauser (1969).
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that if the non-Condorcet candidate has sucient scope for ambiguity when
voters have intense preferences, the winning strategy in any pure strategy
equilibrium in the election will be ambiguous. Either the non-Condorcet
candidate wins because the Condorcet candidate has insucient exibility
to be ambiguous or the Condorcet candidate has sucient exibility to re-
spond to any ambiguous strategy with a strategy that is itself ambiguous
and appeals to a majority of the voters.
We will summarize this argument. Recall that candidate i's strategy set
is W
i
= fp 2 Z : p
Z
i
 a
i
g
Proposition 1: Consider a prole of preferences such that there is a Con-
dorcet winner which is not the rst choice of a majority of voters and voters
have intense preferences (i.e., x
i
< :5; i = 1::::6). Suppose also that can-
didate 1 is a Condorcet candidate. Then there exist a
1
; a
2
> 0 such that a
pure strategy equilibrium exists in the voting game, and the winning strategy
is ambiguous.
The proof is left to the appendix. Before going on, we will make several
remarks about this result. The proof proceeds by showing that there will
be a pure strategy equilibrium in which the winning strategy is ambiguous
if and only if the a
0
i
s satisfy particular inequalities that depend on the given
set of intensities (x
1
; :::; x
6
). From the inequalities that determine the set
of a
0
i
s for which the winning strategy is necessarily ambiguous, we can say
several things. First, suppose that for the levels of the ambiguity for the two
candidates, a
1
; a
2
; there is a pure strategy equilibrium of the voting game
in which the non-Condorcet candidate wins (necessarily with an ambiguous
strategy). Then, if the voters preferences become more intense (i.e., the x
0
i
s
decrease), that candidate will continue to have a winning strategy. If initially
there is a pure strategy equilibrium with the Condorcet candidate winning
with an ambiguous strategy, it may be the case that an increase in voters'
intensities leads to nonexistence of pure strategy equilibria. However, if fol-
lowing an increase in voter's intensities there is a pure strategy equilibrium,
it must be that the winning strategy is ambiguous. Roughly speaking, ambi-
guity is more likely when voters care more intensely about getting their most
preferred outcome.
We will consider next the case of a Condorcet cycle in the set of pure
alternatives Z, that is, every pure alternative is defeated by another pure
alternative in a pairwise majority rule contest. Fishburn (1972) has shown
that in this case there is no Condorcet winner in the set of lotteries over pure
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alternatives Z either. Thus, if the strategies of the two candidates are all
lotteries over pure alternatives, then there is no pure strategy equilibrium.
In our framework, however, candidates are restricted in the set of beliefs
that they can induce in voters, hence there is a possibility that pure strategy
equilibria exist.
Suppose that the distribution of voters' preferences generates a Condorcet
cycle A defeats B; B defeats C; and C defeats A: Suppose further that can-
didate 1 and 2's most preferred outcomes are A and B respectively, and that
each has very limited ability to be ambiguous. That is, W
1
and W
2
contain
lotteries that respectively put probability close to 1 on the two candidates'
most preferred outcomes A and B: Since the Condorcet cycle is such that
A defeats B, A will also defeat any lottery that puts probability suciently
close to 1 on outcome B. Hence, it is straightforward that when there is
suciently limited ability to be ambiguous, the candidate who can induce
the beliefs in voters that his most preferred outcome is surely A will do so
and, consequently, win the election. As in the case of a Condorcet winner dis-
cussed above, the winning strategy need not be ambiguous. But suppose now
that the candidate who prefer outcome A has available a greater scope to be
ambiguous, that is, he is able to induce beliefs in the voters that place greater
probability on outcomes other than A. If voters have intense preferences, the
outcome will be similar to that in the case above with a Condorcet winner.
If candidate 2 has sucient scope to be ambiguous, he will have available a
strategy that defeats A. In particular, if he is able to induce in voters beliefs
that he will never choose A but is indierent over B and C, he will be able
to defeat a candidate who is nearly perfectly identied with outcome A: For
any level of intensities x
i
; one could compute in a manner similar to that in
the proof of theorem 1 the levels of ambiguity a
1
and a
2
for which there is a
pure strategy equilibrium to the voting game in which the winning strategy
is ambiguous. It is worthwhile pointing out that in the case that voters don't
have intense preferences (x
i
> :5), there may be pure strategy equilibria in
which the winning strategy is ambiguous. For example, if candidate 1 has
minimal exibility to be ambiguous while candidate 2 can induce beliefs in
voters that his rst choice is very likely C, candidate 2 will win, since in the
voting cycle C defeats A, and consequently, any lottery putting probability
close to 1 on A: However, the ability of candidate 2 to induce beliefs in voters
that his most preferred outcome is almost certainly C when it is, in fact, B
should probably be considered deception rather than ambiguity.
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More than three alternatives
We restricted our model to the case in which there are three alternatives
primarily for ease of exposition. Our aim was to show that intense preferences
for voters could lead naturally to ambiguity in equilibrium. In the discussion
and proof of the result, we took the utility of a voter's middle ranked alter-
native for his normalized von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function to be
a measure of the intensity of his preferences. When there are three alterna-
tives, this single number completely characterizes the cardinal information
about the relative strength of the voter's preferences. When there are four or
more alternatives, there isn't a single number that characterizes the relative
strength of preferences for any pair of outcomes. But from the logic of our
result it can be seen that it is the relative strength of the preference for the
most preferred outcome over all other outcomes that matters, and we will
continue to use the utility of the second ranked alternative as a measure of
the intensity of preferences of voters. Suppose that in the city example in the
introduction there had been an arbitrary nite number of cities, and suppose
that each voter has a most preferred city, but is close to indierent over all
other cities. The argument presented for the three alternative case would
carry over to this more general case. If there is a Condorcet winner among
the degenerate lotteries that is not the rst choice of a majority of the voters,
the ambiguous strategy that puts equal probability on all rst choices other
than the Condorcet winner will be preferred by a majority of voters to the
Condorcet winner if the utility of the second ranked alternative is suciently
low for all voters. Simply put, when a voter is almost indierent between
all outcomes but his most preferred, a small probability of getting that most
preferred outcome is better than his second choice for sure. Thus, one could
extend the model to the case of multiple alternatives by using as a measure
of the intensity of voters' preferences the utility of the second ranked alter-
native for the normalized von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. The
extension of the arguments to this case follow those in this paper and we
leave them to the reader.
5 Uncertainty about Voters' Intensities
The model of electoral competition we presented in the last section was highly
simplied in order to make clear the role that strategic ambiguity could play.
A consequence of the assumption that candidates know precisely the inten-
15
sity of voters' preferences is that after choosing strategies, one or the other
of the candidates wins with probability 1. This made the expected payos to
the candidates as a function of the joint choice of strategies highly discontin-
uous: any change in a candidate's strategy has either no eect whatsoever, or
reverses the outcome completely. The diculty in establishing the existence
of pure strategy equilibria stemmed to a large extent from this discontinuity
of the candidates' payo functions. In this section we will extend the model
above in a way that both makes the model more plausible from a positive
point of view and increases the chance that pure strategy equilibria exist,
thus enabling us to carry out several simple comparative statics exercises.
We maintain the assumption that voters with the same preference order
have the same preference intensity, but assume that both candidates are
uncertain about the intensities. We assume x
i
; i = 1; :::6 are independently
and identically distributed, and that the candidates have common beliefs
about the distribution function F:We also assume that F is strictly concave,
5
has density function f and is twice continuously dierentiable, with positive
density everywhere. The restriction to concave F is consonant with our
interest in the case that voters have intense preferences; with a concave F ,
there is higher probability on lower values of x
i
than on higher values.
The probability with which a candidate wins the election, that is, the
probability with which a candidate gets at least a majority of the votes,
depends on the strategies chosen by the two candidates (p
1
; p
2
). Thus, the
payo function of candidate i (the probability that he wins) can be repre-
sented as a function P
i
(p
1
; p
2
) which takes values in [0; 1].
The assumptions on F lead to a richer interaction between the candidates,
with both candidates having positive probability of winning for typical joint
choices. The conditions are not, however, sucient to guarantee existence of
a pure strategy equilibrium. If we add an assumption that the candidates'
strategy sets are disjoint, the payo functions P
i
are continuous and there
will be a pure strategy equilibrium. We will maintain our assumed structure
of candidates' strategy sets, namely that they contain all lotteries that put
some minimum probability on the candidate's most preferred alternative. We
add the assumption that this minimum probability is at least 1/2 in order
5
A strictly concave probability distribution is sucient for the results that follow,
but it is not necessary. They can be obtained under weaker assumptions, for example:
probability distributions that are symmetric or have monotone likelihood ratio will satisfy
the rst order condition. The second order condition can also be satised by nonconcave
probability distributions.
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to guarantee that the candidates' strategy sets are disjoint.
Consider again the case in which the preference prole of the voters is such
that there is a Condorcet winner in the set of pure alternatives but it is not the
rst choice of a majority of the voters. Suppose the Condorcet winner is the
most preferred outcome of candidate 1 and that the second candidate's most
preferred outcome is one of the other two outcomes. It is clear that the non-
Condorcet candidate must choose an ambiguous strategy in equilibrium. If
he were to play the unambiguous strategy that puts probability 1 on his most
preferred outcome, the best response for the Condorcet candidate is to pick
the degenerate lottery putting probability 1 on the Condorcet winner, which
leads to the Condorcet candidate winning with probability 1. Trivially, this
cannot be an equilibrium, since with any other strategy the non-Condorcet
candidate will win with positive probability.
Hence, in a pure strategy equilibrium, the non-Condorcet candidate must
choose an ambiguous strategy. But it can be shown that the best response
of the Condorcet candidate to any ambiguous strategy is to be ambiguous
himself, that is, in any pure strategy equilibrium, both candidates will choose
ambiguous strategies. Further, the strategic use of ambiguity is "escalating":
in equilibrium both candidates will be maximally ambiguous, in the sense
that had they not been constrained by the exogenously given strategy sets, a
further reduction of the probability placed on their most preferred outcome
would increase their probability of winning. We summarize these ndings in
the following proposition whose proof is left to the appendix.
Proposition 2: Consider a prole of preferences such that there is a Con-
dorcet winner which is not the rst choice of a majority of voters and voters'
intensities are given by a distribution function F satisfying the conditions
above. Suppose that candidates' strategy sets are as described above with
a
i
>
1
2
for i = 1; 2 and that candidate 1 is a Condorcet candidate. Then there
is a pure strategy equilibrium. Further, in any pure strategy equilibrium,
both candidates put the minimal possible probability on their most preferred
outcome given their strategy sets.
This proposition demonstrates that for some political contests, the strate-
gic use of ambiguity is a necessary component. The proof is similar to the
proof of the rst proposition in that establishes that a best response to an
opponent's strategy is the solution to a set of linear inequalities. >From these
inequalities, we can see how the probability that a particular strategy will
lead to being elected is aected by the parameters of the problem. First,
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suppose we want to compare two problems with the voters in one having
more intense preferences than in the other. One notion of an electorate
having more intense preferences than a second would be that the distribu-
tion function of the second, say F , stochastically dominated the distribution
function of the rst, say G. In this case, G would put higher probability on
lower intensities than F . In this case, the probability that any ambiguous
strategy for the non-Condorcet candidate defeats the degenerate lottery that
puts probability 1 on the Condorcet winner is higher for distribution func-
tion G than for F: An increase in the intensity of preferences as measured by
stochastic dominance increases the benet of any ambiguous strategy against
the Condorcet winner.
We can also deduce from the inequalities determining the equilibrium
how a change in the level of ambiguity available to a candidate, keeping
his opponent's ambiguity level xed, will aect the outcome. Specically,
the probability that a candidate will win increases when his allowed level of
ambiguity alone is increased.
6 Increasing political competition eliminates
ambiguity
In this section we relax the condition that there are two parties and consider
the case in which there are I parties, I  3: We assume that the objective
function of each party is to maximize the proportion of votes it obtains in
the election. We also relax the restriction on the set of alternatives and allow
jZj  3: We assume that the set of strategies of each party is the set of all
probability distributions over the set Z. We assume that voters have von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions over Z and that they vote for the
candidate who oers the highest expected utility. Lastly, we assume that if
more than one party chooses the same lottery, the parties doing so get equal
shares of the voters for whom this is the most preferred lottery on oer.
In the sections above, we provided conditions under which the election
outcome was a pure strategy equilibrium in which the winning strategy was
ambiguous. Roughly, the logic of the argument was that when voters had
intense preferences, if the Condorcet outcome was not the most preferred
outcome for a majority of the voters, it could be defeated by a lottery putting
equal probability on the outcomes other than the Condorcet outcome. As
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discussed above, the logic is not restricted to the case of three alternatives.
Consider the set of voters whose most preferred outcome is not the Condorcet
outcome. A lottery that places equal probability on all the outcomes that
are the most preferred outcome for some voter in this set will be preferred
by all of these voters to the Condorcet outcome if preferences are suciently
intense.
6
We will show that when there are suciently many candidates or parties,
there cannot be ambiguity in equilibrium. The idea can be illustrated with
a simple example. Think of the voters being divided into groups, with each
group having precisely those voters with an identical most preferred outcome.
Suppose that of these groups, the smallest nonempty group contained 10%
of the voters. Lastly, suppose that there are at least 11 parties and that in
equilibrium, at least one chooses an ambiguous strategy. If the most preferred
outcome of each of the groups is the unambiguous strategy of some party,
then clearly an ambiguous strategy will get no votes. Hence, if an ambiguous
strategy is chosen in equilibrium, it must put positive probability on at least
one outcome that is the most preferred outcome of some group and that is not
oered as an unambiguous strategy by some party. But if there are at least 11
parties, at least one must get less than 10% of the votes. If this party chooses
instead an unambiguous strategy that is the most preferred outcome of some
group that is not targeted by any other party (in the sense that some party
has chosen this group's most preferred outcome as an unambiguous strategy,
it will get the votes of this group. But this must increase the number of votes
it gets, contradicting the supposition that an ambiguous strategy could be
an equilibrium choice when there were 11 parties.
The logic of this example is formalized in the following theorem.
Proposition 3: Fix the distribution of voters and their utility functions over
Z. Let N
0
be the smallest number of voters with a common most preferred
outcome. There is a nonempty set of pure strategy equilibria and every party
chooses an unambiguous strategy in every pure strategy equilibrium if the
number of parties is greater than N=N
0
.
There is a natural intuition behind the result: when the number of can-
didates is suciently large, competition for votes will provide incentives for
candidates to target any group of voters that is not already targeted by an-
other party. On the margin, a candidate will do better by specializing in
6
Recall that the utility of the second ranked alternative is the measure of intensity and
that preferences are said to be more intense when this number is lower.
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some subset of the untargeted voters than by competing with other ambigu-
ous candidates for the entire pool of such voters.
The above result takes as given the number of alternatives. While this
is a natural assumption to make, for many problems of interest, there is not
a natural set of exogenously given alternatives; the alternatives are, in fact,
determined within the political process. We presented in the introduction
the example of the choice of a capital city, for which we assumed that there
were three possible choices. In theory, one could imagine that any of the
cities within the country is theoretically a potential capital of the country.
The result above states that with suciently many parties, ambiguity will
not be possible in equilibrium. The logic was that with sucient number of
candidates or parties, each subgroup of voters with a common most preferred
alternative would be the target of some party that unambiguously chooses
as a strategy the degenerate lottery that places probability 1 on that most
preferred outcome. Once voters are targeted in this way, ambiguity oers no
advantages.
However, consider reversing the order in which the number of alternatives
and the number of parties are increased. For an initial set of alternatives, the
xed number of parties might be suciently large that the only pure strategy
equilibria are in unambiguous strategies. But if the number of alternatives
gets larger, there will be, in general, more groups of voters determined by
most preferred outcomes. If the number of alternatives gets large enough,
there won't be enough parties for each group to be targeted by at least one
party. When the set of alternatives gets large enough, some party might nd
it advantageous to target the pool of disaected voters with an ambiguous
strategy that puts positive probability on precisely those alternatives that
are some voter's most preferred outcome, but not the unambiguous strategy
of any party. In the example of choosing a capital city, this would amount
to a party choosing a strategy such as "We are not sure where the capital
should be, but it should denitely not be any of those the other parties
propose." In summary, the logic of our model suggests that when the set of
potential alternatives is large relative to the set of parties, voters are relatively
dispersed with respect to their most preferred outcomes and preferences are
intense, ambiguity is more likely to arise as an equilibrium strategy.
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7 Concluding remarks
The possibility of commitment. We have taken the approach in this paper
that candidates cannot commit to post-election choices during an election.
It is worthwhile discussing this modelling choice.
First, there are several disadvantages of assuming that commitment is
possible. If candidates are assumed to be able to commit to their platform
we often get cycles in pure strategies and we are forced to deal with mixed
strategy equilibria (see for example, Myerson (1993) and Lizzeri (1997)).
Mixed strategy equilibria are undesirable for several reasons. They do not
oer clear qualitative predictions, and typically do not allow comparative
statics. Additionally, in political models that assume commitment, it is not
clear how commitment can be monitored if the platform committed to is
represented by mixed strategy. An advantage of our approach is that without
assuming commitment it yields pure strategy equilibria.
Besides the diculties that arise if commitment is assumed to be possible,
there is a very real question of the degree to which politician, in fact, can
commit. Commitment is problematic in most models simply because the
physical strategies that are available to a candidate who has won an election
are almost always unchanged by actions taken prior to the election. Hence,
commitment cannot be taken to mean that a candidate has eliminated the
possibility that he will do something other than what he has promised.
Commitment is sometimes justied by an argument that in an environ-
ment with repeated elections, commitments can be sustained by a trigger
strategy equilibrium in which voters will not reelect a candidate who does
not fulll his commitments. One can think of this as a reduced-form approach
in which, observing that in the equilibria of the more complex "real" game,
politicians in fact fulll any commitments they make, an analyst writes down
a one-shot game in which it is assumed that the politician can commit to
policies.
There are several diculties with this approach. First, in the actual re-
peated election game it may be true that, in equilibrium, politicians fulll
any commitments they make, but that does not mean they will fulll all
commitments they could make. It's possible that there are promises that a
candidate could make that voters know will not be fullled, hence they would
ignore. Consequently, a candidate wouldn't make such promises since they
have no aect on voters' behavior. But a reduced-form approach to commit-
ments would, in eect, assume that the candidate could actually make the
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commitment, and voters would respond. In sum, a justication for assum-
ing that candidates will fulll commitments because of future consequences
should they renege must model directly the costs and benets of reneging on
commitments in order to determine which commitments will be made and
have an eect on voters' behavior.
A second diculty is that the trigger strategy may not be plausible for
reasons similar to the reasons that strategies that are not subgame perfect are
not plausible. Suppose that in a repeated election situation a candidate who
has failed to fulll a commitment he made previously is up for reelection. The
strategy presumed in the repeated election reduced-form argument would
prescribe that the voters vote against such a candidate. But what if the
alternatives to this candidate are demonstrably worse than he is, as measured
by the expected utility of future policies? There are diculties in reconciling
the credibility of voters' threats to punish candidates who renege on promises
with the rational actor foundations of voting models.
A third problem with the repeated game trigger strategy justication
for commitment stems from the particular simplications inherent in typical
voting models. Voting models typically posit two candidates who vie for
oce with the winner to choose a policy (or set of policies). This abstracts,
for reasons of tractability, from aspects of the problem that are not central to
many issues, but are important to the logic underlying the trigger strategy
justication. Few interesting electoral competitions lead to a winner who
unilaterally chooses the outcomes following the election. More typical is a
situation such as in U.S. presidential elections in which the winner bargains
with and cajoles a Congress to determine nal outcomes. Here, the president
cannot dictate outcomes ignoring Congressional sentiment, but rather, needs
its cooperation or consent to enact many policies. But what is it that a
presidential candidate can commit to in a world in which nal outcomes are
the result of some kind of bargaining or negotiating process? A candidate
cannot commit, say, to spending more money on schools, since it isn't in
his power to deliver on such promises. Instead the nature of promises must
necessarily be of the form "I will do everything possible to increase spending
on schools." But the enforcement of such promises or commitments via
trigger strategies is problematical. How do voters verify that the candidate,
upon being elected "did everything possible to increase school spending"?
Certainly an elected candidate who voted against (or vetoed) such a bill
would be understood to have reneged on his promise, but short of this, voters
may nd it dicult to determine the amount of energy an elected ocial puts
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into eecting those policies to which he committed to in the election. When
there is bargaining over a number of issues and the bargaining isn't public,
it may be impossible for voters to know whether an elected ocial gave any
particular issue top priority.
Beliefs as strategy sets. The discussion above details the diculties with
assuming that candidates can choose arbitrarily among the set of platforms,
and commit to any of them. This is not to argue that they cannot make
strong statements - even promises - and that these might aect voters' be-
havior through changes in their beliefs about what the candidate will do if
elected. Casual observation makes it clear, though, that political candidates'
promises often have little or no eect on voters.
The discussion of the role of commitment in voting models provides the
basis for our approach - a weakening of commitment. There are actions that
candidates can take and statements that they or others can make that can
aect voters' beliefs. The choice of a minority member as a running mate
may lead voters to revise their beliefs about a candidate's sincerity about
civil rights, and endorsements from abortion rights groups may lead voters
to revise their beliefs about a candidate's intentions if it's thought that the
endorsing groups have superior information about a candidate's preferences.
Our model starts from the premise that there are things candidates can do to
aect voters' beliefs, but a candidate's ability to change beliefs is necessarily
limited.
We could have modeled the political discourse underlying these ideas
directly, but have chosen not to, instead modeling the belief formation process
in reduced form in order to focus on ambiguity. We consider the process
through which candidates alter voters' beliefs to be fundamentally interesting
in its own right and plan in future work to model it specically. We will make
a few remarks about the relationship between our approach and one in which
the belief formation process was modelled directly.
First, throughout our analysis we have assumed that a candidate's strat-
egy choice aected voters' beliefs about that candidate only. From a posi-
tive perspective, much political discourse is aimed at aecting voters' beliefs
about candidates' opponents. Past votes, acquaintances, and indiscretions
are brought to the publics' attention with the aim to make the other candi-
date less attractive. It might be possible to extend our model in a mechanical
way to incorporate negative campaigning of this sort; a more satisfying ap-
proach would be to model directly the way in which the beliefs about the
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two candidates arises nontrivially from candidates' choices.
Restrictions on the beliefs that can be induced. It is not so much the choice
of beliefs as strategies that is important to our model as it is the restrictions
on the beliefs available to candidates. The restriction to subsets of beliefs is
important both from a positive modelling point of view (it is obvious that
candidates are limited in this way), and because of the consequences of the
restriction on the outcomes of the model (there are no pure strategy equilibria
in the absence of restrictions).
We took a particularly simple tack in restricting the beliefs available to
candidates, namely that they had available all beliefs that put some minimal
probability on their most preferred alternative. Some aspects of this partic-
ular restriction are important while other aspects could be relaxed without
changing qualitatively our results. First, it is important that the candidates'
strategy sets be disjoint; it is often the case that there will only be mixed
strategy equilibria when they intersect.
The specic restriction that the beliefs available to a candidate put min-
imal probability on his true most preferred outcome is largely for interpre-
tation. As we said above, a candidate may be able to convince voters that
the probability that he will choose a particular outcome is nearly one when
he will in fact, choose another, but it seems to us that this should really be
interpreted as deception, not the kind of ambiguity that motivated us in this
work. The assumption that a candidate has available all beliefs that put
minimal probability on his most preferred outcome isn't strictly necessary.
To guarantee that there is a pure strategy equilibrium in the election game,
it is enough that the candidates' strategy be subsets of the sets we consid-
ered. To assure that the winning strategy is ambiguous, the candidates have
to have available to them suciently ambiguous strategies in the sets we
considered.
Welfare consequences of ambiguity. We demonstrated conditions under which
an ambiguous strategy could defeat a Condorcet winner. The ambiguous
strategy that does this is a lottery that necessarily puts positive probability
on a set of alternatives that by assumption a majority of people like less
than the Condorcet outcome. It's worthwhile to note that this doesn't im-
ply that ambiguity is necessarily welfare decreasing. Ex post, it's true that
when the ambiguous candidate wins, there is an outcome that a majority of
people would prefer to the outcome this candidate chose. But if we measure
welfare ex ante, that is, before the uncertainty about candidates' true pol-
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icy choices are known, welfare judgements are cloudier. Suppose a society
could somehow ban ambiguity. When a Condorcet outcome is defeated by
an ambiguous strategy, it's clear that a majority of voters would vote against
outlawing ambiguity, since outlawing ambiguity is tantamount to voting for
the Condorcet outcome in this case. If we were to make welfare judgements
behind a veil of ignorance where one doesn't know if he will prefer the Con-
dorcet outcome or the lottery, and not knowing whether one will win or lose
if and when the ambiguous candidate chooses an outcome, it could be that in
some cases, expected utility is higher when ambiguous strategies are allowed
than when they are not.
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8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
First we nd conditions for existence of a pure strategy equilibrium if the
sets of strategies for the two candidates are given byW
1
= fp 2 Z : p
B
 a
1
g
and W
2
= fp 2 Z : p
A
 a
2
g, where alternative B is the Condorcet winner
but it is not the rst choice of a majority of voters. Notice that in equilib-
rium there must be one party that has a winning strategy, that is, a strategy
that defeats any strategy available to the opponent. We will prove that a
pure strategy equilibrium exists if and only if either one of the following two
conditions is satised:
i) a
1
> max
n
1
1 x
1
+1 x
6
;
a
2
(1 x
6
)
o
ii) a
2
> max
n
1 x
6
1+(1 x
3
)(1 x
6
)
; a
1
(1  x
6
)
o
If the rst condition holds all winning strategies are nondegenerate lot-
teries. When the second condition holds all winning strategies are nondegen-
erate lotteries if and only if a
2
< 1  x
6
.
For a given set of lotteries W  Z; let D (W ) denote the set of lotteries
that defeat all lotteries inW in pairwise contests: Candidate 2 has a winning
strategy if and only if W
2
T
D (W
1
) 6= ;; that is, his strategy set contains
at least one lottery that defeats all strategies available to his opponent. A
lottery that defeats all lotteries in W
1
must be p
0
2 W
c
1
such that p
0
2
p2W
1
\
D(p). In particular, a winning strategy for candidate 2 must defeat the
degenerate lottery that assigns probability one to the Condorcet winner. In
order to defeat the lottery (0; 1; 0) it is necessary and sucient to nd a
lottery that is preferred by all voters in groups G
1
and G
6
: that is all voters
whose second choice is the Condorcet winner. Thus we need p 2 Z such
that E
p
u
1
= p
A
+ p
B
x
1
> x
1
= u
1
(B) and E
p
u
6
= p
C
+ p
B
x
6
> x
6
= u
6
(B) :
Using these conditions we nd
D(0; 1; 0) =

(p
A
; p
B
; p
C
) 2 Z : 1 
p
A
x
1
< p
B
< 1 
P
A
1  x
6

:
This set is non empty if and only if x
1
+ x
6
< 1; which is satised if the
voters in groups G
1
and G
6
have intense preferences.
With a similar argument, for any lottery p 2 W
1
we can nd the set of
lotteries that defeat it:
D(p) =

p
0
2 Z :
p
A
x
1
+ p
B
 
p
A
0
x
1
< p
B
0
<
p
A
1  x
6
+ p
B
 
p
A
0
1  x
6

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[fp
0
2 Z : p
A
x
3
+ p
B
  p
A
0
x
3
< p
B
0
< bg
[ fp
0
2 Z : p
C
x
4
+ p
B
  p
C
0
x
4
< p
B
0
< bg
The rst subset is nonempty for all p 2 W
1
as long as x
1
+ x
6
< 1, and the
other two subsets are empty for some p 2 W
1
(for instance for p with p
A
= 0
or p
C
= 0). Since we are interested in the intersection of such sets for all
p 2 W
1
we should focus our attention in the intersection of the following sets:
D
s
(p) =

p
0
2 Z :
p
A
x
1
+ p
B
 
p
A
0
x
1
< p
B
0
<
p
A
1  x
6
+ p
B
 
p
A
0
1  x
6

:
Observe that D(p)  D(p
0
) for all p and p
0
such that
p
A
1  x
3
+ p
B
 
p
A
0
1  x
3
< p
B
0
<
p
A
x
1
+ p
B
 
p
A
0
x
1
:
Therefore D(W
1
) = \
p2W
1
D(p) = \
p2fp2W
1
:p
B
=a
1
g
D(p) ,that is, there exists
a lottery p 2 Z that defeats all lotteries inW
1
if and only if p 2 Z defeats
all lotteries in fp 2 Z : p
B
= a
1
g :
Finally, observe that p 2 Z will defeat all lotteries in fp 2 Z : p
B
= a
1
g
if and only if it defeatsf(0; a
1
; 1  a
1
); (1  a
1
; a
1
; 0)g . Thus, we have that
D(W
1
) = D(0; a
1
; 1  a
1
) \D(1  a
1
; a
1
; 0)
=

p 2 Z :
1  a
1
x
1
+ a
1
 
p
A
x
1
< p
B
< a
1
 
p
A
1  x
6

:
and this set is nonempty if and only if x
1
+ x
6
< 2  
1
a
1
. A condition
similar to the one that guarantees existence of a lottery that defeats the
Condorcet winner is also sucient to guarantee that the set of lotteries that
defeats any lottery in W
1
is not empty: intensities of preferences for voters
in groups G
1
and G
6
need to be high enough (see gure 1).
Thus W
2
T
D (W
1
) 6= ; if and only if a
1
>
1
1 x
1
+1 x
6
and a
1
>
a
2
(1 x
6
)
: The
rst condition guarantees that the set D (W
1
) is not empty and the second
one guarantees that the two sets have a nonempty intersection. Observe that
all lotteries in D (W
1
) are nondegenerate lotteries. Since the winning strate-
gies must be contained in W
2
T
D (W
1
), all of them must be nondegenerate
lotteries.
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Suppose that candidate 1's strategy set is S
1
; a proper subset ofW
1
; then
we have that D (S
1
)  D (W
1
) thus the conditions that guarantee a winning
strategy for candidate 2 are even weaker than the ones we nd when the
strategy set of candidate 1 is W
1
. On the other hand, any proper subset of
W
2
that intersects with D (W
1
) provides candidate 2 with a winning strategy.
Similarly, candidate 1 has a winning strategy if and only ifW
1
T
D (W
2
) 6=
;; that is, his strategy set contains at least one lottery that defeats all strate-
gies available to his opponent. For any lottery p 2 W
2
the set of lotteries
that defeats it is given by:
D(p) =

p
0
2 Z : (p
A
  p
0
A
)x
3
< p
0
B
  p
B
<
p
A
  p
0
A
1  x
6

[

p
0
2 Z : p
0
B
  p
B
> max

p
A
  p
0
A
x
1
; (p
A
  p
0
A
)
x
4
1  x
4

:
The rst subset is nonempty for all p 2 W
2
, and the other subset is empty
for some p 2 W
2
(for instance for p with p
C
= 0). Since we are interested in
the intersection of such sets for all p 2 W
2
we should focus our attention in
the intersection of the following sets:
s
D
(p) =

p
0
2 Z : p
B
+ (p
A
  p
0
A
)x
3
< p
0
B
< p
B
+
p
A
  p
0
A
1  x
6

Notice that the lottery that assigns probability one to the Condorcet
winner is contained in this set for all p with
p
A
+p
C
p
A
<
1
1 x
6
:
Using the argument developed for the previous case we can conclude
that D(W
2
) = \
p2W
2
D(p) = \
p2fp2W
2
:p
B
=a
2
g
D(p) ,that is, there exists a
lottery p 2 Z that defeats all lotteries in W
2
if and only if p 2M Z defeats
all lotteries in fp 2 Z : p
A
= a
2
g ; and p 2 Z will defeat all lotteries in
fp 2 Z : p
A
= a
2
g if and only if it defeatsf(a
2
; 0; 1  a
2
); (a
2
; 1  a
2
; 0)g .
Thus, we have that
D(W
2
) = D(a
2
; 0; 1  a
2
) \D(a
2
; 1  a
2
; 0)
=

p 2 Z :
1  a
2
  p
B
x
3
+ a
2
< p
A
< a
2
  p
B
(1  x
6
)

:
This set is not empty if and only if a
2
>
1 x
6
1+(1 x
3
)(1 x
6
)
(see Figure 2). Thus
W
1
T
D (W
2
) 6= ; if and only if a
2
>
1 x
6
1+(1 x
3
)(1 x
6
)
and a
2
> a
1
(1  x
6
): The
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rst condition guarantees that the setD (W
2
) is not empty and the second one
guarantees that the two sets have a non empty intersection. Observe that
all lotteries in D (W
2
) are nondegenerate lotteries as long as a
2
< 1   x
6
,
that is, the set of strategies available to candidate 2 must be large enough.
Otherwise (0; 1; 0) is a winning strategy. Since the winning strategies must
be contained in W
1
T
D (W
2
), when a
2
< 1  x
6
all winning strategies must
be nondegenerate lotteries.
Suppose that candidate 2's strategy set is S
2
; a proper subset ofW
2
; then
we have that D (S
2
)  D (W
2
) thus the conditions that guarantee a winning
strategy for candidate 1 are even weaker than the ones we nd when the
strategy set of candidate 2 is W
2
. On the other hand, any proper subset of
W
1
that intersects with D (W
2
) provides candidate 1 with a winning strategy.
The conditions for existence of equilibrium involve only strict inequalities.
If any of them is satised with equality the candidates tie in equilibrium (at
least one group of voters is indierent). Finally, when these conditions are
not met, no candidate has a winning strategy, and therefore, there is no
pure strategy equilibrium.
7
Thus, we have that there is no pure strategy
equilibrium if and only if a
1
(1   x
6
) < a
2
<
1 x
6
1+(1 x
3
)(1 x
6
)
or
a
2
1 x
6
< a
1
<
1
1 x
1
+1 x
6
. These conditions characterize situations in which either both sets
D(W
1
) and D(W
2
) are empty or, if one of them is not empty, its intersection
with the opponents set is empty.
Proof of Proposition 2:
Suppose that W
1
= fp 2 Z : p
B
 a
1
g and W
2
= fp 2 Z : p
A
 a
2
g.
We consider again the case in which the preference proles of the voters is
such that there is a Condorcet winner in the set of pure alternatives but it
is not the rst choice of a majority of the voters. As before, we assume that
alternative B is the Condorcet winner.
First, notice that the probability with which a lottery p defeats (0; 1; 0)
is given by F

p
A
1 p
B

F

1 
p
A
1 p
B

, that is, as discussed in the previous
section, we need that the proposed lottery is preferred to alternative B by
voters in groups G
1
and G
6
. If we dene x(p
A
; p
B
) =
p
A
1 p
B
and maximize
F (x(p
A
; p
B
))F (1  x(p
A
; p
B
)), we nd the set of lotteries that defeat (0; 1; 0)
with maximal probability. The rst and second order conditions only depend
on the value of x(p
A
; p
B
):
7
We have not investigated the possibility of mixed strategy equilibria in which a can-
didate mixes, choosing to induce dierent beliefs with positive probability on more than
one belief vector.
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f(x)
F (x)
=
f(1  x)
F (1  x)
and
f
0
(x)
f(x)
+
f
0
(1  x)
f(1  x)

f(x)
F (x)
+
f(1  x)
F (1  x)
Since we assume that F (x) is a strictly concave function, we have that
ln[F (x)] is also strictly concave, and thus its rst derivative,
f(x)
F (x)
, is strictly
decreasing. Therefore
f(x)
F (x)
6=
f(y)
F (y)
for all x 6= y and x =
1
2
is the only value
that satises the rst order condition. Furthermore, the strict concavity of
F (x) guarantees that F
00
(x) = f
0
(x)  0; consequently, at x =
1
2
, f
0
(x) <
[f(x)]
2
F (x)
, and the second order conditions is satised at x =
1
2
. Thus, there is
a local maximum at x =
1
2
. At the extreme points of the domain (0 and 1)
the function F (x)F (1   x) has value zero. Since x =
1
2
is the only critical
point, we have that x =
1
2
is the only maximizer and the lotteries that satisfy
p
B
= 1  2p
A
defeat (0; 1; 0) with maximal probability: [F (1=2)]
2
.
Similarly, the probability with which a lottery p
0
defeats a lottery p in
the set W
1
= fp 2 Z : p
B
 a
1
g is given by F

p
A
0
 p
A
p
B
 p
B
0

F

1 
p
A
0
 p
A
p
B
 p
B
0

.
Again, as before, this lottery must be preferred to all lotteries in W
1
by
all voters in groups G
1
and G
6
. We consider the problem of maximizing
F

p
A
0
 p
A
p
B
 p
B
0

F

1 
p
A
0
 p
A
p
B
 p
B
0

and we nd that the rst and second order con-
ditions of this problem are exactly as the previous ones. Thus,
p
A
0
 p
A
p
B
 p
B
0
=
1
2
is
the unique maximizer and the lotteries that satisfy p
B
0
= p
B
  2(p
A
0
  p
A
)
defeat p 2 W
1
= fp 2 Z : p
B
 a
1
g with maximal probability.
Observe that the maximal probability with which any lottery can defeat
a strategy available to candidate 1, F (x

)F (1   x

), depends only on the
probability distribution of the intensity of the voters preferences. Given
our assumption of concavity on the probability distribution this maximal
probability is simply m = [F (1=2)]
2
:
Now we will show that a pure strategy equilibrium exists if and only if
a
2

1
2
and a
1
+ a
2
> 1; and that it is unique: in equilibrium candidate 1
chooses (0; a
1
; 1  a
1
) and candidate 2 chooses (a
2
; 0; 1  a
2
).
i) Suppose that a
2

1
2
and a
1
+ a
2
> 1: If a
2
> 1 
a
1
2
, both candidates
have dominant strategies: there is a unique equilibrium in which candidate 1
will choose (0; a
1
; 1 a
1
) and candidate 2 will choose (a
2
; 0; 1 a
2
). Candidate
2 cannot defeat any strategy of candidate 1 with probabilitym, and (a
2
; 0; 1 
a
2
) is a best response for candidate 2 to any strategy available to candidate
1 since it is the closest lottery to a lottery that can defeat any strategy
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of candidate 1 with probability m. On the other hand, (0; a
1
; 1   a
1
) is a
dominant strategy for candidate 1 because the distance between the lotteries
that defeat it with probability m and the lotteries available to candidate 2
is maximal.
If a
2
6 1 
a
1
2
, there is a subset of strategies of candidate 1 that candidate
2 cannot defeat with probability m (all lotteries p 2 W
1
such that p
B
<
2 (a
2
  p
A
)) and the best response of candidate 2 to any of these strategies
is (a
2
; 0; 1   a
2
). If candidate 2 chooses (a
2
; 0; 1   a
2
), and a
2

1
2
the best
response for candidate 1 is (0; a
1
; 1 a
1
). Thus, there is a unique equilibrium
in which candidate 1 chooses (0; a
1
; 1 a
1
) and candidate 2 chooses (a
2
; 0; 1 
a
2
).
ii) If a
1
+ a
2
 1, that is, the strategy sets of the two candidates have
a nonempty intersection, there is a subset of strategies for candidate 1 that
candidate 2 cannot defeat with maximal probability: p 2 W
1
such that p
B
<
2 (a
2
  p
A
) : The best response of candidate 2 to any of these is (a
2
; 0; 1 a
2
):
The best response of candidate 1 to (a
2
; 0; 1  a
2
) is now (a
1
; 1  a
1
; 0); but
candidate 2 can choose a lottery that defeats it with probability m: Thus
there is no pure strategy equilibrium in this case.
iii) Finally, suppose that a
2
<
1
2
and a
1
+ a
2
> 1. If a
2
>
a
1
2
there is
a subset of strategies of candidate 1 that candidate 2 cannot defeat with
probability m: all lotteries p 2 W
1
such that p
B
< 2 (a
2
  p
A
) : The best
response of candidate 2 to any of these strategies is (a
2
; 0; 1 a
2
). If candidate
2 chooses (a
2
; 0; 1   a
2
), the best response for candidate 1 is (1   a
1
; a
1
; 0).
In this case there is no equilibrium, because candidate 2 will respond with
 
1 
a
1
2
; 0;
a
1
2

, the strategy that maximizes his probability of winning against
(1   a
1
; a
1
; 0), and candidate 1 will want to move back to (0; a
1
; 1   a
1
).
If a
2

a
1
2
; for every strategy available to candidate 1 there is a strategy
available to candidate 2 that allows him to win with probabilitym, therefore,
there is no pure strategy equilibrium. 
Proof of Proposition 3:
Let I denote the number of candidates competing in the election and N
0
denote the size of the smallest group of voters that have the same alternative
as their rst choice. First notice that if each alternative is chosen with
probability one by at least one candidate, then clearly a candidate that uses
an ambiguous strategy will get no votes. Hence, if an ambiguous strategy
is chosen in equilibrium, it must put positive probability on at least one
alternative that is not chosen with probability one by any candidate. But
if N
0
>
N
I
, there must be at least one candidate that gets less than
N
I
. If
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this candidate chooses instead an unambiguous strategy that is the most
preferred outcome of some group that is not chosen by any other candidate,
it will get the votes of this group. Since N
z
> N
0
>
N
I
for all z; this must
increase his payo.
We will show that for I >
N
N
0
there exists a set of pure strategy equilibria
in which all candidates choose degenerate lotteries, and all alternatives are
chosen with probability one by at least one candidate.
8
.
If all candidates use only degenerate lotteries, that is, P = (p
1
; :::; p
I
)
with p
i
2 Z
d
for all i = 1; :::; I, let k
z
denote the number of candidates that
assign probability one to alternative z: Then the payo for candidate i will
be given by: 
i
(P ) =
N
z
k
z
if candidate i has decided to assign probability 1 to
alternative z; where N
z
represents the number of voters that have z as their
rst choice. We will show now that for each I we can nd values for k
z
; with
P
z2Z
k
z
= I and k
z
> 1 for all z 2 Z such that the corresponding strategies
(degenerate lotteries) form a Nash equilibrium.
Observe that if k
z
> 1 for all z 2 Z; deviations to ambiguous strategies
are not protable since a voter will always vote for a candidate that chooses
her most preferred alternative with probability one, a candidate that chooses
an ambiguous strategy will receive zero votes.
Let int [q] denote the integer part of q; where q is any positive number
and let t

= I 
P
z2Z
int

N
z
I
N

. Observe that 0 6 t

6 jZj   1.
First suppose that t

= 0; and consider
e
k
z
= int

N
z
I
N

for all z 2 Z:
Notice that since I >
N
N
0
then we must have
e
k
z
> 1 for all z 2 Z.
Suppose that P represents the prole of strategies in which all candidates
choose degenerate lotteries and such that for each alternative z there are
exactly
e
k
z
candidates that assign probability one to it.
Since for each i we have that 
i
(P ) =
N
z
int
[
N
z
I
N
]
for some z 2 Z; we must
have that 
i
(P ) >
N
I
; and this can only be true if 
i
(P ) =
N
I
for all i. Any
deviation of i from assigning probability one to z to assigning probability one
to z
0
is not protable since as a result the payo corresponding to z increases
and the one corresponding to z
0
decreases. Thus, the candidates' strategies
corresponding to these values
e
k form an equilibrium.
Now suppose that t

> 0. Let Z
t

be the set of alternatives corresponding
to the most preferred ones by each one of the t

largest groups of voters.
8
This condition implies that I > jZj ; since we always must have N
0
6
N
jZj
:
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Dene
e
k
z
= int

N
z
I
N

+1 for all z 2 Z
t

and
e
k
z
= int

N
z
I
N

for all z 2 Z nZ
t

;
and let P
0
represent the prole of strategies corresponding to these values.
We will show that these strategies form an equilibrium.
Again we have that
e
k
z
> 1 for all z 2 Z, and therefore deviations to
ambiguous strategies are not protable in this case either.
Given P
0
, for all z 2 Z
t

we must have that 
z
(P
0
) <
N
I t

which is the
payo that all candidates that assign probability one to alternatives in ZnZ
t

obtain. Thus, to prove that P
0
is an equilibrium we have to show that the
candidates that obtain the smallest payo (candidates that assign probability
one to the alternative in Z
t

which is most preferred by the smallest group of
voters) do not want to deviate to assigning probability one to the alternative
which guarantees the largest payo (which is the alternative in Z nZ
t

most
preferred by the largest group of voters). That is, the following condition
must hold:
N
z
int

N
z
I
N

+ 1
>
N
z
0
int
h
N
z
0
I
N
i
+ 1
where z is the alternative in Z
t

which is most preferred by the smallest
group of voters and z
0
is the alternative in Z n Z
t

most preferred by the
largest group of voters. And this condition always holds since N
z
> N
z
0
: 
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Figure 1: Winning strategies for candidate 2
1 1
1
1
- -
+ £
a p
x
a pA B
p
a p
x
aB A£
- -
-
+1
1
1
6
1
p a
p
xB
A³ -1
1
a p
x
pA B1
61
-
-
³
Figure 2: Winning strategies for candidate 1
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